Workshop Report from the 33rd Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions: 'Achieving realistic decisions at the seventh BWC review conference in 2011'

This workshop was hosted by the Association Suisse de Pugwash in association with the Geneva International Peace Research Institute GIPRI. The meeting was supported by a grant provided by the Swiss federal authorities. The workshop took place immediately prior to the Seventh Review Conference on the operation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in December 2011. It was attended by 57 participants, all by invitation and in their personal capacities, from 17 countries including, Australia, Canada, China, Germany, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, the Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States of America (USA) and Ukraine. This report is the sole responsibility of its author, who was asked to prepare a brief account of the proceedings of the meeting in consultation with the Steering Committee. It does not necessarily reflect a consensus of the workshop as a whole, nor of the Study Group. The workshop was strictly governed by the Chatham House Rule, so reference to specific speakers is not detailed here

Education and outreach activities within the biological weapons convention

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Fostering the Biosecurity Norm: Biosecurity Education for the Next Generation of Life Scientists

Sustainable education on biosecurity and dual use for life scientists is increasingly recognised as being an important element of broader efforts to achieve biosecurity. To address this issue, a joint project between the Landau Network-Centro Volta and the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre has been initiated to analyse what currently exists in terms of biosecurity and dual use education, but also how such education can be most effectively achieved in a sustainable fashion. The purpose of this paper is to elaborate on the findings of a survey on the extent of, and attitudes to, biosecurity and dual use education in European universities, and outline the educational activities undertaken through a network of contacts built through the survey and some of the conclusions drawn from engagement with this network. The paper also outlines the development and optimization of an Educational Module Resource intended to support lecturers in the improvement and implementation of educational material related to biosecurity and dual use. This is further expanded by the authors' experience derived from implementation tests conducted at universities around Europe, in which material was tested with students and faculty members. To date, the main results from this evaluative process are that students and faculties are generally unaware of biosecurity and dual use concerns, but nonetheless appear interested in discussing these topics and have initiated challenging debates on the importance of balancing factors such as security, research, secrecy and development. However, serious efforts in terms of developing and promulgating education more broadly across the life science community will require concerted actions which look at education but also at other mutually reinforcing intervention points such as funding bodies, authors and publishers. Moreover, in the longer term it will also be necessary to develop new mechanisms and metrics to determine success in these activities and ensure that educational activities are contributing, along with other legal and regulatory measures, to mitigating the challenge of potential misuse of the life sciences in the 21st century

Reviewing science and technology in the context of the Biological Weapons Convention

There is evidence of the emergence of a consensus amongst a number of States Parties to the BWC and NGOs on the principle of changing the process of S&T review as part of the wider quinquennial review process of the BWC. However, there is little evidence of agreement on the details of what needs to be done, how, by whom and to what end. Wrestling with these questions will be essential if state parties wish to capitalise on the momentum that has built up around changing S&T reviews and convert this into an evolution of the practice. With the review conference less than a year away, thinking needs to begin sooner, rather than later

So you want to do ‘something’ on science and technology reviews in the biological weapons convention?

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Raising Awareness: A Hippocratic Oath for Life Sciences

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Compliance revisited: an incremental approach to compliance in the biological and toxin weapons convention

Since the collapse of negotiations around a protocol to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 2001, states parties have begun to discuss several novel issues linked to the broader implementation of the BWC as part of a series of intersessional meetings. While initially fruitful, this approach has generated diminishing returns in the last five years. Moreover, in addressing these broader issues of implementation, biological disarmament diplomacy has largely neglected the thorny issue of compliance. Compliance with the BWC is more than a simple binary choice to sign a commitment not to develop or produce biological weapons. It requires the adherence to all the obligations, both negative and positive, undertaken by BWC states parties in signing and ratifying the convention. In the BWC context, this is complicated by the ambiguity surrounding certain obligations, changes in science and security, and the limited resource capacity of some states to fulfill their obligations. Under such circumstances, without episodically revisiting compliance, there remains the risk that BWC will become ever more fragmented, outmoded and poorly implemented. Although many states insist strengthening the convention can only be achieved through a multilaterally negotiated, legally binding verification protocol, this is not politically feasible for the foreseeable future. Nor is this necessarily true; an incremental approach to strengthening the convention could be pursued, dealing with mutually reinforcing components of the regime in a balanced manner and laying the foundations for future work, if and when it becomes politically expedient to proceed. This Occasional Paper proposes a number of activities that could be pursued as part of an incremental approach to revisiting compliance with the BWC

We're doomed

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‘Muddling through’ in the Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention

The paper looks at power in the origins and evolution of the Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). It begins by looking at the origins of what some have termed a taboo surrounding poison weapons, before turning to look at the role of different forms of power in the genesis of the BWC in the late 1960s. The article proceeds to look at the role of institutional power in the evolution of the convention before turning to the limitations generated by the diffused nature of power. The chapter concludes by exploring the literature on public administration, particularly Lindblom’s notion of ‘incrementalism’ to outline how the BWC is essentially ‘muddling through’ and to some extent is largely limited to muddling through because of the consensus rule and the limits of productive power within the BWC

A peer-review mechanism for the biological and toxin weapons convention

At the Seventh Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in December 2011, a working paper submitted by France sought to initiate debate on the potential of developing a peer review system for the BTWC to build confidence in the implementation of the Convention. The concept of peer review has precedent in the activities of a number of other international organizations, yet the objectives, format, participants and structure of peer review mechanisms vary. Accordingly, this report seeks to take forward this debate by looking at what peer review is; how it works elsewhere; how it could be applied in the context of the BTWC; what would be required to move forward; and what possible advantages or disadvantages a peer-review process would confer to the BTWC in light of the Convention’s recent histor